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The subject of gambling has baffled and intrigued the 
writer for a very long time. ~hat could have been a much 
more presentable paper was, however, foiled by the writer's 
deep.ignorance of the very essence of gambling, 1.e. how to 
gamble. Had the writer known of this important prereguisite 
she would probably have refrained from 0meddling" in it. 
However, after starting out with high aspirations and 
lofty deals of being a near 'expert• on the subj ~ct (even 
a~ter losing out in the game from the VPry outset) the 
writer could not po sibly abandon the whole idea. 
What is finally presented in this paper ls only a small 
part of what the writer actually gained. To begin with t~e 
writer fo nd great difficulty ln xpr-e s s Ln: her t houq: ts. 
Gam1nq mays emin ly app ar to encompass only ~he plying of 
cards and the Ilic • This is not so. It inclu a , amon.j s t, oth 1 
things, private and public lotteries, betting, Cdrd gdm_s 
and also "legalised gaming" like horse rac1n, ~mp t Number 
£kor, Social Nelfare lotteries, Sports Toto etc. £ach of 















Infact the writer conducted several interviews 
with some pe~sonalities involved in the area of 
legalised gaming. 
However due to some difficulties she succumbed to the 
temptation of all times, i.e. to abandon it after 
failing to sur~ount t e problems. 
The writer wishes to emphasise again that what follows 
hereafter is not the whole or even half t~e story 
of gaming in Malaysia. Regard it as sna l I arie cdo t e 
contain din each chapter and since t e writer cannot 
even claim gr-at originality, it is best ta~en with 
pinch of salt. 
Th. main pi~ce of l gi latlon go rn ng gambl nq in 
lj 
Malaysia is the Common Gaming Hu din nee, 1953 
compliment d by the tting Ordin nee 1953. 
The purpose of the Comm n Gaming Ordinunce 1953 ls to 
suppress common gaming hous~s, public gaming and public 
lotteries. It is of paramo nt importance to understand 
t.: at it does not make a total prohibition of gaming or lotterie 
The snme ap~lies for betting unuer the aetting Ordinance 
1953. 
Gaming and lotteri~s are only illegal und~r c~rtain 
circumstnnces which are described in the Ordinance with 
/ 
the qualifying words "public" or 'public place' or 'common 
gaming hous s' Gaming in any other place is p~rfec:tly 










gaming and lottery which constitute offences. Aspects 
which do not constitute any offence under the Ordinance 
l ) 
came under the adjective private. 
"barning" is defined in the Common Gaming Houses 
Ordinance 1953 in S.2. 
L 
"Gaming", with its grammatical variations and 
cognate expressi•ns, means th~ playing of any game of chance 
) 
or of mixed chance and skill for money or money's wo~th. 
A gume of skill is one in which nothing nothing is 
left to chance and in which superior knowledJe ctnd attention 
or superior strength, agility and practice, gain the 
victory. Th g mes of mere still are exc~ed ngly few for 
it excludes every game in which t ne e Lerneri t of chance enters. 
Chess perhaps and draughts and some few ga:nes ej uscem generi s 
would beg mes of mere skill. No me of CMr s no g,me in J 
which dice w~ce us d , could, I suon.I t , fc.111 un et· such 
category. ~ven billi r so 1 n s ~int~ re scored ioc un- 
intentional succe·s, could hurdly b call d garn~s of m~ce 
skill. But som p~ople my r. ard billiards as a ga~e of 
skill on the grounds th tit dos not cease to be such 
merely because sometimes points are scored unintentionally. 
Games of skill are distinguished from games of chanqe 
in t. at the latter are games dependent upon chance or luck 
I 
and in w ich adroitness has no place at all. And games 
of chance or of mixed chance and skill are illegal under 
the Common Gaming Houses Ordin nee. 
The mean nq of the word ·~am.nJ' must be consider·d ln 
r'!' 1 ti on to : - 
(,) min in publl 










There are some popular gamblinq games mostly in the 
card category which do not usually form subjects of 
criminal charges as they are invariably played under 
circumstances which do not constitute any offence under 
the Ordindnce. The main reasons being that thenJmber of persons 
who may participate in them at one time is limited, more often 
than not to four persons only. It is obvious therefore 
that if only four persons are able to participate in a 
particular game at any one ti:ne, then th:re is no opportunity 
for participation therein ~y the public, and unle3s the game 
is playftd in a public place, ordinarily no off nee ls 
committed. 
Gaming in a common qaming house is r strict d to <J<ir. 'S of 
chance as gam1~s of skill are outside tlie bounds of law. 
The expres ion common gaminq hou s ls of nglish oriqin. 
They are nuis nces in the eyes of the law, not only b.c~use 
they are gr.at tempt tlons to idlen ~a but becaus they re 
apt to draw together numb.rs of disorderly persons. 
It ls illegal to keep a common qaming house as laid 
out in s.2 of the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance. - 
A common gaming house ls either a place to which t~e 
general public are able to resort for tne purpose of 
gaming or a place to which, though barr_d to t~e public, 
I 
I 
ls kept or used by the owners or occupiers prl~arily for, 
I 
I 










A practical question may i:irise as to whet~er 
social 
clubs could ever be dee ned to be a 
common gaming house 
if facilities for gaming are 
catered for. 
In REX vs. FONG CHC:NG CHENG! lt was held 
that a 
place does not become a common gaming house merely 
because gami~g habitually occurs in it. A private 
residence is not a common gaming ~ouse because the 
owner makes a practice of inviting his fri0nds to 
it to gamble, nor do the r~ernises of an ~rdinary social club 
become a common gamin~ house merely because the club 
provides facilities for its memb rs to gamble and some 
of them habitually use the premises for that purpose. 
This reasonin0 ls consistent with c~mmon sense. 
For if lt wcr2 otherwise no social club whose primary 
object is soci 1 int rcourse, or s Ott of any ol.~c;c.'t"'if hoV'I 
eeeerlf'tio". 










would be within the law if it habitually permitted any 
of its members to gamble on its premises and provided facilities 
for that purpose. It is also logical because without the 
modification we will~ left in a position where probably 
three quarters of the adult population of the Federation ar~ 
unprosecuted criminals and in future th~n no man could 
play "old maid" with his family in his own house for a ten ·ents 
stake without committin a criminal offence. 
However, notwithstanding tl1at the avowed object of a club 
is to provide social ameniti~s to its members if in fact 
the primary obj .ct of t'~at Club is, or has b·come, gamtng, 
and its premises ar~ kept or us d primarily f• r th~t purpose, 
then such a club is a common gamin hou~e within the 
meaning of and subj~ct to the provisions of the Ordin;1nce. 
It should be noted that th re is a difference betw•en he 
offence of gaming in a common gamin1 hou .. in Sing por 
as compared to Malays!! 
•Gaming' is not d finPd in the Singapore Ordinance. 
It is defined in our country nd ls r~stricted to the 
playing of games of chance or if mixed chance and skill for 
mon~y or ~oneys worth. Gam~s of skill are outsi~e the 
scope. 
I 
In Slnqapor~ t~e ordinary meaning of 'gaminq' 
is used i.e. the playing of any game for money or mon~ys 
wo~th. Th~r fore it is immaterial wh~ther the game is 
of skill or of chance or of mixed chance rlOrl sl·ill. ~o 










country, unless the prosecution successfully invote the 
pres~mption under S.19 of the Common Gaming Houses 
Ordinance 1953. They have to orove that the game played 
in the Common Guminq House was a ga e of chance or of 










THE VARIOUS PRESUMPTIONS CONTAINED IN TiiE 
COMMON GAMING HOUSES ORDINANCE 1953: 
SHORT STUD¥ 
The Ordinance contains several sections which create 
presumptions and dispenses with the normal onus of proof 
placed on the prosecution (as required by the Evidence 
Ordinance 1950). These sections presume certain fact• to 
exist and the onus of disproving them is thrown on the 
defence. The crown thus is given a powerful weapon to 
(1) 
assist it in the suppression of crime. 
But it must be understood that these sections namely 
sections 4(2); 6(2); 7(3); 8(2); 9(2); 11(1) (2) & (3); 
19 and 20(1) do not "make" offences. They exist to help 
the prosedltion of persons who have been accused of an 
offence under the Ordinance. The offence is determined by 
the actual circumstances of the gaming i.e. whether the 
gaming was "public place" or "common gaming house" or in 
private. If the facts presumed do not actually exist 
then no offence is committed. For instance Section 16(1) 





(1) Objection has been expressed against this type of 
legislation although it has been held in SAMINATHAN 
vs. P.P. (1955) MJL 121 that these statutory 
presumptions are really .nothing more than an extension 
of the provisions of S.106 of the t:vidence Ordinance 1950 
which provide8 that when any fact is sp ci lly within 
the knowledge of any per5on, th burd no pr ving th t 











arrest persons found therein, provided that things or 
circumstances which are made by this Ordinance presumptive 
evidence of guilt are found in such place or on any person 
therein. This means that on presumptive evidence alon~ a 
police officer is empowered to arrest. But this does not 
necessarily imply that an offence has already been or is 
being committed. 
I. S.19 
The most difficult and important sections dealing 
with presumptions are s.19 and s.20. The sections 
provide preau11ptions that: 
(1) a place is a common gaming house 
(2) that it is so kept or used by the occupier 
( 3) under ~)with th permi sslon of the owner. 
For S, 19 the circumstances which raise the above 
presumptions are provided for in the section, 
and if any one or •ore of them occurs, the 
presumptions come into force. The effect of the 
section is that it places on any person whose 
premises are entered under the Ordinance and 
found to contain instruments of gaming the burden 
of proving that those premises are not a common 
gaming house within ithe meaning of the law. 
I 
Certainly these sections sound very alarming and 
I 
extraordinary, giving great leeway for the police 
and prosecution to round up almost anybody in 









are found, and charge them with keeping a 
common gaming house. However they exist in the 
Gaming Ordinance and the courts have therefore 
to utilize them though in their instructions 
of s.20 and s.19 they have done all in their 
power to prevent them bearing too hardly upon 
the subject. 
a) ORIGIN OF s.19 AND s.20 
In order to understand these two sections the 
better, it ls necessary to note their origin and 
their appearance in other gaming laws analoqoua 
to this Ordinance. 
S,8 of the 8 and 9 Vic. C,109 (English) provides 
that where any cards, dice, balls, counters, 
tables or other instruments of gaming used in 
playing any unlawful game are found in any place 
entered under the Act, it is evidence until the 
contrary be proved that such place ls used as a 
common gaming house and that the persons found 
therein were playing, although no play was 
~ 
actually going on at the tim~ of the entry. 
However, the difficulty of getting such 
I evidence of gaming was so great that this portion 
i 
of the Act proved to be practically a "dead 
letter" because all the gaming houses were found 
to be provided with the means of secretly 










alarm being given. Therefore the 17 and 18 Vic. 
c.38 was passed, s.2 of which enacted that 
obstructing the entry of constables or fitting 
a house in order to obstruct the police should 
be evidence until the contrary be proved that 
the place so fitted or in which the obstruction 
took place was a common gaming house. These two 
sections are then the original sources from 
which S .19 and S. 20 have given.o.r,·~e.l"\. 
In the Straits Settlement colonies, the 
initial sections to adopt the English counter- 
parts were section 58 and 60 of the Police Act 
XIII of 1856. Then was passed Ordinance XIII 
of 1870, Sections 14 and 15 dealing with the same 
presumptions. Next came Ordinance IX of 1870 
S, 13 and S,141 Ordln' nee XIII of 1879, S,11 and 
s.12 and Ordinance V of 1888, S,14 and s,1s, 
Finally it is all incorporated in the 1953 
Ordinance under Sections 19 and 20. Some differences 
can be found in the wording of these various sections 
but it does not affect the crux of the matter · 
hence authorities under any of these Ordinances 
I 
should be applicable under the present 
Ordinance so far as the actual presumptions are 
I 
concerned. It might not however, apply so far 










b) INSTRUMENTS OR APPLIANCES FOR GAMING: S.19 
The above expression is not specifically defined 
in the Ordinance buts. 3 provides that the expression 
includes "all articles declared under sub-section (2) 
to be instruments or appliances for gaming and all 
articles which are used in or for the purpose of gaming 
or a lottery''• By A.P. 29/66, the sub-section (2) 
referred has been changed to sub-section (3) with the 
word ''Minister" used instead of "Chief Secretary". 
Up to date no instruments or appliances for gaming 
(2) 
has been gazetted by the Minister. It leaves us to 
look at the other alternative given, for the word 
"includes" de"°tea that apart from gazetted instruments/ 
appliances there may be other means of gaming. 
A question that arises isa Does the actual user 
of an article on a single occasion for the purpose of 
g~~ing make that article an instrument or appliance of 
gaming? Or is it restricted to ~..rticles which by their 
nature are used in for the purpose of gaming or a 
lottery? It is a difficult question which h~s never 





(2) In Singapore under s. 186 of the Common Gaming Houses 
Ordinance 1961 (No. 2 of 1961), the Minister for Home 
Affair• in the exercise of the powers conferred by sub- - 
section (3) of S.2 of the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance 
declared the article• set out in a given ~ch dul to b 










The Bombay Act of 1887 (amended in 1890) 
contains an almost similar provision to our 
corresponding section. It reads 
s. 2z"In this Act the expression 'instruments 
of gaming' includes any article used or 
intended to be used as a subject or means 
of gaming••••••••••"• 
These words seem to import in themselves 
that it would be sufficient for the purposes of 
the act if an article were only used once as a 
subject or means of gaming. The leading case on 
the point is the QUEEN-EMPRESS vs KANJI BHIMJI,<3> 
This case decided that any article which is 
actually used as am ans of gaming comes within 
the defination ot instruments of gaming even though 
' 
it may not have been specially devised or intended 
for that p~rpos~. 
However the contrary had been held in guEEN- 
EMPRESS VS GOVI•o.<4> Parsons J.held that there 
was no indication in the amending act of 1890 of 
any intention to restrict the meaning of the word 
"used''• If the legislature had so intended, they 
I 
~ould have surely indicated it. He went further 
to say that whether or not an article is used as 
(3) I.L.R. 17 BOM. 184 










a subject or means of gaming or wagering, is 
a queation of fact which has to be determined 
upon the evidence i~ each case. 
Telang J, was even more emp~atic in his 
view that some enlargement of the scope of the 
words was intended. He held that the word 
"means" is a word with a wider signification 
than was given to the word "instruments" of 
gaming and when the former word is added by 
express separate leghlation to the defination of 
the latter, the inference is that some widening 
of the scope of the old law must have been 
intended. 
This view however cannot be applied to the 
construction of our local Ordinance because of 
the absence of the word "means" (which according 
to Telang J. enlarges the acope). Instead we use 
the word "articles". Furthermore, unlike the 
Bombay Act 1887, we have no subsequent amending 
act to enhance this need for a wider construction ·' 
of the word. It is humbly submitted that the 
view held in the former case of Queen-Smpress vs. 
Kanji Bhiaji(S) is ~he better one. The purpose 
of the Act is to supress gambling because of its 
inherent evils, not because certain games are 










deemed to be distasteful. Therefor~ as long as a 
person gambles, even once, using a totally new 
instrument, may be hitherto unknown, then this 
single user of the instruments should be deemed 
that which is forbidden by the 6ct. If the 
instrument/appliance to be illegal must be that 
normally used or is for the purpose of gaming 
then it would be cutting down the object of the 
act. So long as the accused were found playirg 
any game of chance o~ of mixed chance and st.ill for 
money or moneys' worth, the fact that the 
instruments which they used is a novel one, not 
usually used by gamblers, should not be a 
deterrent factor. Apart from normal instruments 
like the mahjong tiles for instance, the courts 
should be given scope to hold that any 
instrument of ga~ing, even though used only once, 
so long as it is used to game, then it is an 
instrument or appli2nce of 9aming falling under 
the act. 
Sir Roland Braddell however feels that the 
construction must be strict and in favour of the 
subject. He says that: 
"The Legislature in this colony had then 
no precise defination before them in !888 










considered safer not to define the expression 
at all but to interpret it as was done by a 
w~de statement of what the expression was to 
include, and it may therefore never have been 
intended to make a single "user" sufficient for the 
(6) 
purpose of the Ordinance." 
I humbly beg to differ in my opinion. The 
fact that there has been an obvious omission to 
define the phrase by the legislature could possibly 
mean that they are leaving the field open for a 
wide interpretation and 'wide' here I t?.ke it to 
mean to include a single user, unlike the interpr~tation 
of 'wide' given by Sir R. Br .ell, restricting t e 
phrase to exclude a single user. 
It ls curious to note that a place in the 
Ordinance shall be deemed to be 'us d' for a 
purpose if it is used for that purpose _ven on 
one occasslon only, as provided for in sub-s_ction 
J1.2_ al~o. o: cou~se on' can argue that th· r.e aguin if 
the Legislature intended to include a 
I 
I 
(6) Sir Roland Braddell, COM~ON GAMING ~ous:s - a 











single user as an instrument of gaming under 
the Ordinance it would surely provide for it, as 
it provided for a 'place' used. 
These are all possible arguments which in 
effect carry no legal precedence and the question 
can only be solved when it arises in court. 
Probably the best compromise is to adopt 
' J' i E Go"•ind(7) Parsons s view n Queen mpreRs vs. ~ 
that whether or not an article is used as a 
subject or means of ~a~lng is a question of 
fact which has to be determined upon the evidence 
in each case. This wns the basis upon which the 
case of Rex vs. Foo ~ee Cheng (S) was decided. 
It was held that a pin table is not necessarily 
an instrument or appliance for 9nmin9 but if it 
has actually been used for gaming on a.ny occasion 
then it at once falls within the definntion and 
the pr~sumption under S.19 of the Ordinance 
arises, and the court must infer until the 
contrary 1~ proved that the place in which the pin 
table is found is a common gaming house 'and is 
so kept or used by the occupier thereof. 
(7) I.L.R. 16 BOM. 283 










Some of the articles which has been held 
to be instruments of gaming includes lottery 
(9) (10) 
tickets , a pari-mutuel , a marked coin 
proved to have been used for the purpose of 
(11) (12) 
making a bet , and money (although in 
the case of PYARELAL GOKUL PRASAD vs. EMP,<13> 
it was held that not all moneys are instruments 
of gaming· I~ a particular coin or a particular 
note has in fact been used as a means of gaming 
then that particular coin or particular currency 
note does fall within the defination). 
c) "OCCUPIER" 
There is a ~re~umption under S.19 that a place 
is a common gaming house ao kept by the occupier 
if upon entry into premises any instrument for 
gaming are found therein or if persons are seen 
or heard to escape therefrom on the approach or 
entry of a Magistrate or unlawfully prevented from 
entering. 
(9) R vs. Lee Hong Kang & Others (1882) 3 ky. 145 
(10) Tallet v~. Thomas (1871) L.R • .§. QBD 514; see also 
Everett vs. Shand (1931) 2 K.B. 522 
(11) P.X. DeSouza vs, Emg. L-1932_:j BOM, 180 
(12) O~man bin Trund vs. P.P. (1912) 1 FMSLR 84 











This presumption is unsuitable i# some 
evidence to the contrary can be proved. In R vs. 
(14) Tu where the only facts proved 
Khoo Seang w 
against the accused were that he was the occupier 
of the house and that persons e8caped from it on 
the arrival of the police, which is statutory proof 
under s.19 that the house was so kept by the 
occupier as a common gaming house, Wood J held 
that it was not safe to convict wh~re there was 
some evidence to the contrary. 
Who is an occupier? Ordinarily the word 
means the tenant of the pr mises, although he 
may personally be ~sent from the premises. This 
is laid down in "Maxwell on Interpr tation of 
statutes• 2nd Edition at page 81. It is to be 
noted that the word is not defined in this law, 
though it has been in other laws for the purposes 
of those laws. The defination was attempted by 
Wood J. in two cases although upon perusal the 
definations appear to conflict with each.-other. 
In R vs. Aw Eng Tho (lS), ~e decided in 1884 that 
I 
there must be proof 1of actual and not constructive 
I 
occupation, and the man who really occupied the 
whole house we acquitted, while in the case of 
(14) (1888) 4 ky. 392 










TAN YOK LAN(lG) six years later, he held th2t the 
actual occupant was not the occupier but her 
husband, who paid the rent and lived somewhere 
elst?.·,. This was followed by Law (Ag. c.J.) in 
(17) 
Rex vs. Liong Thye Hye • The accused was a 
married woman who occupied the premises in 
question but whose husband paid the rent. The 
husband only went home once a week and at the 
time of the occurence in the case, was living 
at a place where he was working. Law (Ag. C.J.) 
~onsidered that the accused was not the occupier. 
It should be borne in ~ind that S.19 is merely 
a presumptiv section which does not carry any 
conviction. If certain conditions provided for 
are found then a cert in presumption arises. This 
could be ~f great help in the u~e of the convicting 
sections of 4(1) (9) + (b) (lB). In a prosecution 
on a charge under this section the Charge should 
specify the capacity in which the accused is 
charged. The charge should allege either that the 
(16) (1890) 4 kysche 668. 
(17) B. Common Gaming Hou~e 147. 
(18) The presumption (pro·vided by s.19 and s.20) that 
a place is a Common Gaming House ls a general one 
and may be 1nvo~ed against any accused whenever it 
ls necessary for the purposes of the prosecution to 
prove that a place is a Common Gaming House. The 










accused is the owner or that he is the occupier 
or that he is a person having the use temporarily 
or otherwise of the pl ace in cues tion. Wh£: re 
a sect!on as in this case, comprises more than 
one act which constitute an offence, the 
prosecution should make up their minds with 
which of those offences they propose to charge 
the accused. If they are not sure which of the 
offences will be establi~hed by the f~cts they can 
prove against the accused, they should charge 
WI~~ 
him in tha offences in the alternative. 
d) "Pt:RMIT'tING" 
The presumption under s,19 of keeping or 
using a place does not apr.ly when the charge is 
of "permitting". The pr esumr.t i on under S.19 of 
the Ordinance cannot t-~ 1nvol4lcd men the 
accused is charged with perm1 tting another person 
to keep or use the place as a common gaming house. 
occupier can of course only be invol=Ved against 
the "occupier" of ttie premises under s.4(a) and 
I 
the 3rd presumption that the place is so kept 
or used with the permission of the owner can be 










That presumption only applies when the accused 
is charged with keeping or using the premises as 
a common gaming house under s.4(1) Ca) of the 
Ordinance. 
S,4(2) provides that "any person who 
occupies or has the use temporarily of a place 
which is kept or used by another person as a 
common gaming house shall be presumed until the 
contrary is proved to have permitted such place 
to be so kept or used". If a presumption under 
. 
S.19 is ~a~sed that the place is a common gaming 
house then a further presumption aris~s under the 
same section that the place is so kept or used by 
the occupi r thereof. It will be seen that the 
prosecution cannot rely simultaneously upon S.19 
and s.4(2) of t~e Federation Ordinance. The two 
presumptions deal with entirely separate and 
distent kinds of cases. 
II. Section 20 
The section creates the following 3 
I 
presumptions in certain clrcumsta~ces in regard 
1 
to a place (similar to the presumptions in s.19) 
(1) that it ls a common gamin~ house 









(3) that the occupier so keepa or uses it. 
~nd pf the notice prescribed in SS (2) has 
been served on the owner of the premises a 
further presumption arises:- 
(4) that the place is so kept with the 
permission of the owner 
The circumstances which caise the above 
presumption are any one or more of the following 
provided the place has been ntered under the 
proviJions of the.Ordinance:- 
(a) where any µassage or staircase or 
means of access to any part of the premises 
is unusually narrow or steep or otherwise 
difficult to pass 
(b) where any part of the premises is 
provided with unusual or unusually numerous 
means for preventing or obstructing an entry 
(c) wh<~re any part of the premises .Ls 
provided with unusual contrivances for 
i 
enabling persons therein to see or ascertain 
the approach OL entry of persons or for 
giving the alarm or for f\.~ciJitating escape 










It is interesting to note that a petition 
was signed by owners of house property in 
Singapore in 1876 asking for exemption from 
liability which befalls them should their houses, 
rented out to tenants, be found to be a common 
gaming house by the Gaming Houses Ordinance 1870. 
(19) (found at the National In their report 
Ardtives) they complained that the Ordinance has 
been so framed snd construed as to make 
innocent owners of houses responsible in fine and 
imprisonment for the use without their knowledge 
or consent of their houses for gaming purposes. 
At page lxxiii the petition reads: 
"••••••ind ed the 16th und 17th clause of 
the Act appear to be clearly intended to 
secure an owner ha~ing full notice of the use 
to which the tenant~ are putting his house, 
but unfcrtunutely the 15th secticn is so 
framed~~ practicclly to over-ride the 
protecting ~rovision of the 16th and 17th 
sections. This section provides that 
I 
I 
"whenever any passage, staircase or means 
of access, in a place lawfully enttred as 
(19) Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Straits 










aforesaid, to any part thereof is unusually 
narrow or steep, or otherwise •ifficult 
to pass, or any part of tha premises is 
provided with unusual or unusually 
numerous ~eans for preventing or obstructing 
an entry, with unusual contrivances for 
enabling persons therein to see or 
ascertain the approach or entry of persons, 
or .'"or giving the alarm, or for facilitating 
escape from the premises, it shall be 
presumed, until the contrary be shown that 
the pl ace is a gaming hous o , th at the same 
is so kept or used by the occupier thereof, 
and that lt is so ke£t with the permission 
of the owner thereof"! 
The petitioners requested for the repeal of the 
last 13 words of section 15 above (equivalent 
to our present s.20). Among the reasons given 
were that under this section, Magistrates··have 
held that the presence of a ladder at the wall, 
I 
which is common in Chinese houses, whic~ could 
I 
be made to give accc~s to the roof, or the 
~ddit!on of a swinging bar to the usucl trap door 










under this section, that the house is a gamb~ling 
house and is so used with the owners' permission, 
although these and similar fittings can 
readily be added by the occupier without the 
landlords' knowledge or suspicion, for a house 
once let, the landlord has no power whatever 
during the tenant's occpation to enter it without 
the tenant's leave. 
In response to this appeal the Attorney 
General at the time, Mr. R. Braddell, replied 
that(20 at page ccxx 
" ••••• the petitioners have made out a fair 
ground for relief and at any rate they ought 
to be placed by the law in a position better 
suited to enable them to deal with the 
responsibility thrown on them as house 
owners. If such relief is given, I think 
the responsibility of them may properly be 
allowed to rest, for experience has _proved 
that nothing but the strongest measures will 
suffice to compete with the astuteness of 
I . 
parties, who find it so much to their 
interest to break the law as to gaming". 
(2) Le(Jislative Council Proceedings, Mondy 










In order to give relief, he proposed (and 
it was accepted and hence the law amended to the -·,..-~ ..... ...., 
position as if now)<21> to enact that the police, 
in every case when it comes to their knowledge 
that a house is fitted for gaming are to give 
notice thereof to the owners and occupiers and 
such noti~es to be served on the persons 
inscribed as owners in the Municipal Books, and 
if no names are there given, then the notices are 
to be fixed to the premises and a penalty is 
provided against every sub-tenant, who knowing 
of such notice, does not inform hi landlord 
"~ith thia provision as to notice, I propose to 
make the presumption at the end of s,1s<22> 
applicable only in cases wh re notice has been 
served•, he wrote. 
It may be said that obliging the police to 
give such notices will interfere with their 
prospects of capture in certain cases but at 
the same time, as the object is to prevent gaming, 
(21) See s.20(2) and s.20(3) 1953 Ordinance. 










not merely to capture gamblers, it is hoped that 
the advantage gained through the landlords, if they 
omit to take proper steps to check their tenants 
will counterbalance the injury in preventing 
captures.With the amended law, the owners are 
put in a position to do right, then, if they do 
not do so, they will be themselves to blaae, and 
less hesitation would be felt in putting the law 
in force against them. We may thus find the 
law to work as an actual pressure on the 
occupiers, who will soon find difficulty in the 
way of getting houses in which to carry on with 
their wort. 
(23) Courts have held that in the case of 
principal tenants of a house who let out rooms 
which becomes common gaming house can be 
convicted of having permitted the use of the 
room as a common gaming house, if he is ahown to 
have known of the user and not taken steps to 
prevent it by determining the tenancy or otherwise. 
Sometimes knowledge of such user can be inferred 
' 
I 
from circumstances like the keys being in control 
of the principal t£nant and intact if they were 
living closely together. 











THE BETTING ORDINANCE 1953 
(1) IN~RODUCTION 
The Betting Bill 1953 was first presented to the Federal 
Legislative Council on the third of September 1953 to improve 
the existing law in the former Federated Malay States and 
Straits Settlement and to extend it throughout the former un- 
federated Malay States. The legal position then was that whilst 
there were measures to control betting in the Straits Settlementi 
and the former Federated Malay States, there were no measures 
at all to control bettin~ int e former Unfederated Malay 5tates. 
The Straits Settlements Ordinance (Cap 29) and the fcderul~d 
•1 ~alay States' Enactment (Cap.48) was substantially similar 
and the Bill presented followed c l o s e l y t h c Betting Ordin nee 
~f the Straits Settlement (Cap.29). It i8 also complimentary 
•2 
to the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance 1953, six of the nd- 
~!nistrative provisions of which have been incorporated in the 
~ill in order to tighten up the law against betting. 
For example in clause 8, which was new so far is the 
Jegislation in the former Federated Malay States and Straits 
Settlements were concerned. It was provided t~at ~ny person 
accepting stakes or wages or founa in possession cf any 
;~ 
.(TAl3Lt: A) to show the substantial similarity be twe en the v ar Lou s 
betting legislation. 
l . ~ :l ee eompart:tf:ive Tabe 
2. Up to d.Jte, th0 n mb r h:i3 b·en Lnc r e as cd to 1 ht,·· 
:>ecti0ns II nd 24(2) oft. I'? C''llO lQc nn l. ctl n n llA 
nd 18(2) of t ne £3'2ttjn9 Ord. l 5 (, · !ll l. in l 7) 










books, accounts, documents etc. which are used or appear to 
be used in connection with or to relate to the business of a 
bookmaker shall be presumed, if it ls done in a public place 
to be frequP.nting or loitering on such places for the purpose 
of bookmaking. That is the presumption and its up t~ tlie 
accused to dispel that presumption. 
The :~est Malaysi.an Ordinance was substantially amended 
in 1961 by Act 8 of 1961, which on ~he whole m"de it more 
simJ.lar to the Slngapo e Ordinance. Among the amendments 
made was the substitution of the deflnations of the terms 
"bookmaker" and "comm n amlng house~ The n-w dcfinat!on of 
"bookmaker" includes a runnor and a penc.i I ! .r nd these two 
latter terms ar defined. 
Tho Betting ~rdlncnce 1953 s~ekn to st prP.s~ 
ttfn9 tn 
public plac , bookmaklnq nd common bP.tting nous s. Otht:!r: lse 
bettinq is llow d , in f ct some ls lcg."lllsr•d for ·~x rnple ne 
being a mem::>cr of the Turf Club, bets t!-ir uh the rot~. Setting 
l with a "bookie" is lllogal, ju ... t as if it:i dono in a cori ion 
bettinq house, which ls deem d to be a common nuisunce ?~d 
contrary to law uncer s.3. Any person found guilty of such 
an offence shall be liable to imprisonment. 











for two years or to a fine of twenty thous2nd dollars or to 
both such imprisonment and fine. 
2) BOOKrl,J\F:;R 
include an individual who 
The definatlon of a bookmaker is wide. It does not only 
Cl) receives or negotiates bet~ or wages, whether on a 
cash or credit basis and whether for money or ~oney's 
worth 
or (2) in any manner holds himself out or permits himself 
to be held out in any ~anner s a person w~o receives 
or nn otiQtes such bets or wa es, 
but also envelopes such persons who help this individual either 
qs a penciller, runner zerv nt or 4 
1 nt. Th~r0.fore ~nybody 
who forms part of the who! system, e it the Kin pjn or 
mere servant will be deem d a book1nak e r , 
Jection 6 (3) is the penalty cluuse for any person who cts 
as a bookmaker or who for the purpose of bookmakinq or bett ng 
etc. frequents, loiters in any str0et, roadway etc. 
A quest! n arises whether a punter (a person .,...ho pl e co s l.J"\·K 
the bets i-A the "bookies") would P.s:a e liubility unJEr this 
section. An ingenious argument was forwarded by .def nee Counsel 
in the case of P.P. vs. L~E YOK~ KA! •s. 
le argued that the Respondent might have pl~ced his ~ets w'th I . 
1 bookie (instead of the Respondent bein0 a bookie hi~self 
I "penciller• means a person who h~lps a bookmaker to k ep 
hLs nccount!J ':>r records of bets in conn ... :cti in \vlli1 ho r s 
r cs. 
"r nncr" mens a pf'!rson mploy,.,d by 
nd settle b ts, 1th r on s~l y r n 
< ok k ?t" o rn11. t 










as charged by the Prosecution) in which case he would be a 
punter and could therefore not be caught by the provioions 
of section 6(3){a) of the Ordinance. 
It was held that if tt1e bets had been placed with a bookie, 
'=' then PI would be a document which relates or appears to r:late 
to t ho business of a bookmaker under section 8( 1). 
$ection 8 Cl) r~ads as follows:- 
"/lny person accepting or r ceiv n·_, bets, stakes or 
wages, or found in poss ssion of any oo 'c s, accounts 
docum nts, telegrams, writings, circulars, cards orother 
articles which are used or appear to have b•~en used, 
or 1ntC?nd d to be used in connection with or which 
relato or appear to relate to the business of a 
bookmaker shall be pr sumed until tha contr ry 1~ prov d 
to be acting as a bookm ker". 
In view of th pr~sumption un er this section it would be for 
the Respondent to prove th the did not ct s a bookmak~r 
but only as a punter, in which cas th n h wo11ld xpo~e him3.lf 
to prosecution under section 6 (1) of the Ordinance. 
It·can at one be seen that the law extends lta hc1nds both 
ways, i.e. both the one who bets and the persons who accepts 
the bets to make it more 













difficult for a person, involved in any way in the business 
of bookmaking1 to esca~e liability. Inf act, an individual may 
not actually act as a bookmaker to be liable, suffice if he 
in any manner holds himself out or permits himself to be held 
out in any manner as a person who receiv~s or neJotlates such 
7 
bets or wages. 
Prior to the amendment made in 1961 from section 8 it 
would appear that time would be an essence of a cha~ge under 
it i.e. if the documents or articles sei~ed relute to a past 
(or race or any other contingency) then it would not be "ar t Lc l .s 
which are used or appedr to be used in connection1 with or 
to relate to the bu~iness of a bookmaker ••••• 118• 
Hence the presumption implicit in the section would not op rate 
if the accused can show that the articles und documents relate 
to a past event. Thus lacunae seemed to h v been r_medied 
II 
by the amendment, with the inclusion of th-= phra:..e or intended 
to be used in connecti0n with obvious reference to a future 
7. See S.2(11). 











In a Singapore case, TAH BIAN OU" 9 vs. P.P. 
wit{,, 
the point was clarified. The accu sed had baen charged f-n the 
offence of acting as a bookmaker under a s.5(3) (a) of the 
Singapore Betting Ordinance. The learned Magistrate acquitted 
the accused as he held that time was the essence of the charge, 
and as the races to which the docu~~nt fond on the accused 
related had been run he could no lonJer be a bookmaker in 
respect of them. fhc deputy public prosecutor ap: .aled and 
it was then held that the section refers to the possession 
of documents or other articles which are usP.d or app~ar to 
h ve b.en u~cd or int~nded to be used for bookmaking dnd once 
po s s e s s Lo n of the document ls e s t a lish .d t F! tlrn f e c t o r is 
immaterial and irrelevant and the person found in posses ion 
is pr~sumed to be a bookmaker. 
Since the amendments were specially ~nacted to rtQn pdrall~l 
to the corresponding lcgisl~tion in Sing~pore, this ca~e would 
be of strong persuasive authority. Thus person cannot now 
escape by the mere fact that the articles found upon im relate 
to a race already run or a contingency already past. 
/ 
9. (1966) 1 MW 68. 










3) COMMON £3E-:.'TINGS HOU.JE (C.6H) 
As already mentioned, a common betting r~use shall 
by virtue of s.3 be deemed to be a comm0n nui3~nce and 
contrary to law. And the offences relating to common 
betting house is laid down gener~lly in section 4. A 
Presumption arises against any person who occupi s or h~s the 
Use temporally of a place which ls kept or used by another 
Person us a common ~etting ouse th the~ s permitted sch 
Place to be so kept or used. 11 
CBH is quite clearly defined in the Ordinance in S.2. 
It is specifically I.id out in three sub sccti ns when 
Pl c is held to be a com on s t t Lnq 11 us • If l .. ce 
falls under el t re r' one of the thr e then 1 t o ld e d _e .. d 
a common betting house. It w;1s held in R vs. LI ~ ;fi, C.hJ. ,~12 
that if a p l ace is us d for wag wring it m"y be a c mmon 0 ·ttlng 
hou~e even thoulh the wageffln is upon h r_sult of a g me 
Of skill. 
A very interesting discussion on the i~suA of w ~t m~kes 
a common betting house can be found in the Sup::-cm~ Court 
13 d~cizlon of R vs. L!N t\lM P01T , in 1~33 in Singapore. 
It appear~d that the action of the Appellant arount_d to 
this: that they being members of the Club made bets in th~ 
Members Enclosure with other members of the Clubs. The sub- 
stance of the first change was that the Appellants 
11. e S.4(2} 
12. 
13. 
( l 3 3) i1W 212. 
. 










used a place in front of the Totallsator as a common 
betting house. Th socond charge r ope a t s this first charge 
witn the a·j ition of the words ''which p Lace " (i.e. the '.)~tti1CJ 
house) w.s habitually used for betting". 
The definatlon of "pldce" and "betting h U3e~ are 
conta!n:d in s.2 of the Ordinance. 
<..:om1non b~ t ting h ou s e means any 1 ce kept or used for 
betting or w eri l nq on any :ent or contingency of or rel at Ln 
to any horse r ec or oth r race, fight, g. me, s cor t o r .ix-sr c t se 
to which the public, or any class of t~e public has, or may 
have, c=e~s, nd ~ny place kept or us~d for ~dbitual Jetting 
or w 9enin9 on ny such event or contlnq ncy DS afor .sold, 
Wh<!ther the publ le h 5 or may n ave acce .. s t ho r to o r .......... tt ·~- . 
"Pl ce" is ns dofln din he pres.nt Ordln nc. 
n w ongle in hi 
the long titl- of the Ordinance, which w a "To uppress 
Betting Houses and b~tt•ng in pu lie 
14 
1e h.vl d _h.1t the wo r d 
"Pl.ice'' w, !ch the Ordinance efinos c n t o i t: r Lma f rc I e only 
~ ... 
to public plac~s, given by t~e titl of the 
14. r~e titl• of an ordinance c~n ~c lock.d 3t ln d_ciding 
the constr-1cti)n .ind <;eneral scope of the Ord: ·::.,u(;.r:.' :;T\ Ul'S 
~ 7th s _ l'IvN P• 36. 
C.-tses 1 , I .;Lu!." . c vs. -o~s .CY ccrnP01 ,TI N C 1399) 1 ..;H. 3 
(1904) 73 i.. •. J •• <J2 j further 










Ordinance the Legislature announce that (unl~ s t~ere is 
something else in the context) that is the only kind of place 
to which the Ord. shall apply. It was clear then, in his 
opinion, the Members Enclosures was not a publi~ place. On 
the contrary it was a private place i.e. a place for members 
only. 
The learned C.J. divided the defination of common betting 
house into 2 parts (1) the lst part deals with a place where 
betting ls carried on and t~e public or ny cl~~s of ~: e 
public has dccess to it. If his view was riJ t thQb the Turf 
Club is not a class of the pub Li c t n Ls part dos not nvolve 
the Appellant in any offence. 
(2) The 2nd part deals wltn a place u d or habitunl betting 
wh ther th pu lie h s or has not cc_ss th ~to. 
Ther-e last words conflict wit the titl of the Ord ,nee but 
the oper tion of th~ Ordin nee ls not llrnitPd by its tl l • 
The result th refo~e is that b ttln , ven in pl ce to w· ich 
the public h2ve no ccess, is n offen ·e if the pl ce is habitual!~ 
used for gaming. 
It wo ld appe e r at first s Lqn t; tl1at t h L s r ov t s i ·rn · ak o s 
1 t an off nee for anyone to play ;_my game nywh e r c .: cv e n in one" s 
own private house. It seems hardly possi)le t'1~t the l~~i3lat~re 
ould have contemplated so extraordinary an ~vent. ~h~ r allJ 
e s sent l o I word in ooth def i nations 1 s the wo r d "! c::.:: i tu ·11 '", 
This word NJS -xp r e s s ed by St._vens J. in R vs. f''~iJ.:.., .:.:H'",rJu 
C .. 'Gl5 .... I 











as referring to a place to which the gener~l ~ublic can 
resort for gaming or a place to which though barred to the 
public, is kept or used by the owners or occupie~s primarily 
for gaming. A private residence, he says, do_s not bec?me 
a common gaming house because the owner makes a practise of 
inviting his friends to it to q en.o l e , nor 40 the premises of 
an ordinary social club be come a co.nrncn :JG:Ti ng house me re Ly 
because the club provides facilities for its members to gomble 
and some of th~rn habitually u s e the pr-erm s e s for ti1ut pu r oo se , 
Using ths a~ove argument, his Lords ip held that th~ Singapore 
Turf Club 1° primarily a bona fid2 Club for ~he s~ort of horse 
16 At page 166 , he. s ey s ; 
"The Sport is t e e s se n t l a I : ettin h e ac c i d-vn t , '"he 
fact that many mem.ers of th~ club go to the races 3nd bet 
c n give us no right to strain an 1 ct of Parl.i 21"1.~nt whi .h w s 
pass~d foradiffer~nt purpo , 1. •• or th_ suppres~i0n of 
common bet tin house not for th · .rupp r 'Ssion of ho r a r ac i n • 
If t+i Ls vl~!W iven was co r r ct th •. n al 1 th ppcll. nt dld w~s, 
as a mcnber of ab na fid club, to make bets wit ot _r 
members of t' at .1 rb upon th n su l t of hors races 










which was the primary object of the exiat~n~e of the 
club. And that then, for the reasons ~iven above, is not 
an offence within the Ordinance. 
It should also be noted that should the Appellant be found 
guilty, th~n the committee would likewise be liable in 
permitting the Appellant to keep a common betting llou~e on 
the Cluo premises. 
In the s~me c3se, a different conclusion was arrived at 
by 'Jhitlcy J. His Lordship found the Appellant guilty, ap ar t; 
from other ~2 sons, because the evidcn e establishPd ~ cle~r 
case of bett _ng by rnak lng a b oo k on ·.ach r ac e on two successive 
17 race days. 
He stressed on t h e fact t t the pl ace wh Lch tii•'y w~re 
charged with using w s not tile Turf Club premi~; s nor the 
enclosure but this p rticul.r bnnch \1~s wlthin ~he enclosure. 
The d _finition of "place" w.1s cl - r l y d sl']n'"'d t 
word tile wi le s t po-i s i b l.e me an: n J• Th•~r r. n b _ no doub t .hen 
t h at, the bench Ln u sti ·rn c mes withi'"l he cl !fin ti on of 
"place" in S.2 of t:)"' Ord. In .n. \V.r to t e ue ti n of w ether 
the pl ace w s a c "1 n et t I q . o u , wit. in t le ;"1 an i n-j of 
the Ordinance, His Lordship h~ld that the ~irst ~2lf of the 
d~finition cqnnot apply bee use only me!"l'.)ers of ':h - Turf 
Club had access to the place in qu2stion nd me~. ~rs 
I 
1 7. The ~nd Appellant abe t t ed him by brin']in·~ t-.'·,e li;·s t o 
that spot t~~-eDy rendering himself un~er S.114 oft.~ Penal 
CD _utlty s a principal of any offence which th' first 










Of 1 b t th bl i 1 f t . . 1. 18 a c u ore no e pu c or a c 35;:; o .e puo a c , 
In order to bring this place within the second half of defination 
the Court must be satisfied that the place in question was 
"used by the Appellant for habitual betting an contingencies 
relating to horse races. The distinction between the first 
and second halves of the defination has in the add~ti~n of 
the wo r d "habitual". If tne place is a pu lie ')ne to ,,rhich 
tha pu~lic or a class thereof have access it is only n0cessary 
to prove u~e ror ~etting on on2 occ~sion ut if it is ~ot ubllc 
as in the pr2 ent case it is n cessary to prove that it bHs 
b0.en used h.:ibitually. Hls Lordship was of the oi'.)inion t:aat 
t he r e c an be no doubt on the ev i nee th at t n e pl ce · .•• s u svd 
by th m for bettin on such contin.enc e nd t hc f rt t.~ at 
it wns ao used durin~ _v~ry r ce for t~o ~cys is su~ cirnt 
to establish t at it was so es d by t rn h · itually. le nee 
he held tnat the pp 11 nt cor mlttP-d e off n<:. c arg~ ~nd 
was properly c nvict d. 
His Loraship ten ventur d f rther to dlscu$ .. ert in 
cogent points wn t cn " re r a t s e d i \ l:i"'" c : .. i r ae of l e h :dr· g 
as tending to show t.1 t it c n .o t h erv e b -e n t.i e i.1 _r Lo o f 
the Legisl ture to ring within the Ordinance Qcls.·suc. ~~ 
tho~e prov_d gainst t~e Appellant. e refuted t!H-! toe 
n rr w inter~r_t tion given to the lon; title of he 
Ord · n ;:; n c e an d h 2 l d t · . u t the obj 2 ct is to s ~ i"' r - s s . · c-.: t t i. :1 ~--J in 
public pl~c~s ~n~ 1lso in CBH and by the defin tion 
18. In the c se of PP vs. LAU TiriS- K"I (1955) MW 206 it was 
h ·l t1 t the evidence showed t h a t the <) n-vr 1 pu ... l<: did 
not .iv aoce s s to the off lee of the man a ie r, and t t~r" or 
tne p r o ae cu t Lon h d f iled to prove t·1at tne of s i,· w. , u s c. 
, ._. r. co nmon b t t Ln q house. 3 n s h VI O<J U in!•;::; t,,rf th 
c t· in offtr-o, .ven if they h avo cc !~ , , r n 1 ':..t 











of the public. This jecisir:in is c()nsi.s'-E'r.t ·d.t'1 the r e ason i n-: 
of the case '.JeincJ discussed above o'·fcr :::! 'r-iy .n Lt I ?./ J. If 
a club is held not to be a public place where the puolic ~ 
class of .:he public c an have access, t'lcre'., -io r e r~""'son then 










' ~ I 
in S.2 a CBH may be either a pla:e to which the public have 
access i.e. a public p l cce or a p l o-;e to .h Lch the pul l i c have 
no access which is a private plc~e ~nd would include a 
club. Upon the reasoning his Lordship w s of the opinion 
that nothing in t~e Long title of the Ord. prevented the 
application of the Ordinance to the facts cstablish0d in the 
case. 
~ith regards to t~e c~se of 20N ~~~~~~~~;....;.,;..~~~~ 
\ihi tley J a re~d with the ratio d cicendi of t. at 
18 vs. ~.P. 
case as 
being an accurate stat~ment of the 1·w and if appli d to the 
particular facts of that c.c:ise there can be no doubt that 110 
offence WdS committ:d. 3ut His Lords ip felt th tit Jid 
not follow tat betti g betw en members on the premises of 
a club can under no circumstances be ill~gal. 
What was sugg st.d was that in this c se th 2 members 
not the club, were during t os two days using th benc 
a club and in his lPC'rn d opinion thio Lo dship felt th<.1t the 
bench was used habitually, primarily and ~xclus·v ly for 
bettlng and whether that b e t t Lrrq as dun ~ i th me ,· ers or 
hih"I 
outsiders or both it seems to~ to 01 ~within t e 
18.-See j1:1cign0At ef oiecv-=-1"1!t J (1930) .'3JCR 139. 










mLs ch Le f a i rr.cd at by the or d , Th2 2 '-: ."'1 ~ .. n t s jis~l.:-yed 
great astuteness end set up their little ~etting salo~n on 
a s~all corner of the club's premises ~nj t~er~ encouraged 
betting by accepting co:nmissi•)ns on cr.,,dit, a far -oo r e 
dangerous nd i:isidous f rm of vetting than P1at p r ov i dod by 
t• or n(~ total i s a t I-e n • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 
tJo,--o 30 ,t~ .j cJ:! rn-•J ··ould e !)'H'C9~ebl · ,J.A .J'. t it.J ~r:":.l •• oeo• 
Th2 me t c e r stcJnds ,15 it is ~"~n ·w'i th r n arne nc 1~n1\'.. rnrtce 
to ~.2. 
me t n iu'o s t anc 
dl t nou jh it 
s b c n r: 'c n t. 
1 
l n ,., 3 :"" r t s , ... h '~ 1 - > t lJ e i n . 
a new a·idltion to nco-np r.s +h e olac<-!S used hy t'l b ok-» k e r 
:na .le th rou t~e t l phon. or 
2u. 
.. son n 
i pref raole esp _!ally i our ttt~nti n i 
t "r• ' - 
int'"'!ntion of the Ord. as a whole L~. to t..i':l r "'r:1 
sh de behind tlte immunity a f forded to tt1em and they c an t!1en 
~et to th_ir h~arts ccntcnt with fellow m~mbers - 
20. .Lhis a:_'ded pcovision has t nu s ovt:rrul id the .k!·- si,.n Ls i d 
dovm in 'ic c s e of :."D~:L :C'.R'~!::~~ vs. ;. (l'.)57) 'LJ 185 
wh-=t-e i..t was held that althouyh t1H~ • ..:: ·" ..... s .:;·;.!,_:~k~ t_ at 
bet. •..i"'· ~ l i '0y telephone this dir:l not: ~no•mt to :icce ~ 
\·dt'1·n .rii: ,,_anln-J o~ the Jefination :'.n .. <lS t"l~'"" ·1 s no 
ot. r .Vi(Jl:' e u~nt the public had ·CC:e!:;S to HH• ~CCl.L-,~d'. 
J t \'T ;-: s not c 1 u b w i th i n the f i r s t 11·"'1 l.:i o · L . _ 
'"i . \tion of clu • r111s t"fie is furt~ (" ~,, 1 i r- . d '"'·~r·· u .... 
th·. 10rd ''• -::~··s'' rias b en dF-.!finc.d b) ic,·e•. 
thr-nurJh t e t~lcphon _, by pnct or- by ) (• 1y ... 









without :-. '1 e 1 o n q a i 111 of t 11 e 1 aw r . d ch ;_., · t- h · -rr , 
In gamin] c as e s the need f o r exp rt evic"''11:e is ;'leia.1t'1ble 
Usually the prosecuti n 21 in in tryin1 to build i:s cos~ 
would ~11 up ~n ~xpert witness to testify thst a cer·tain 
d·)cum·!nt is inde -·d a r-=cord of stake on horses etc. ~ut t'"le 
we! ht to be ~ttached on thAse ~itn~ssPs to a lJr~. ~xt~nt 
seemed to de end on ~•1_ totalitr of the evid~nre of ~r?d than 
ln any par~i~ l~r .oint. Co~·nt r~as~n ~u~t · e 1iven to bac~ 
up a fact, · lth'.)ugh s .. ~tim s self r- xp l an t c r v en t r i .s are 
acc~pt0d arid i-~, u Lr e s no z xp e r t to s y t at tney e r e a record 
of sta:es 
cnv l c t Lon ·1 is Cj ·~ r•d n .=ipp ·• 1 n L'1 c.1 .. of 
vs. Thr. l n s f 1 .i "'nt: •'Vi·.!.'• '' t 
support t conviction. 'I'n e u d.j · f s l t t'1.it t \" ev l . n· c 
given by on of t h c two p r s.·cuti n ~litnt~.3;.:., ·.,.;, s t 1 y 
meritic· l arid b a s d n nu -o r s .n: h t! o lynl~cs 1 Jtln'' · e 
Rue.-> ~oo'<s, in l:h·~ 1-.h1C s L~ v i dr-d for n k i n o suc h ( r t r i c ,s , 
The only ol er witn-.·s \.J s < cl1...!C'< t.rn~)l()ycd in t i « ,'J-f ·~lub 
Was or wa s , o't a n11~1'1br r of the Turf Club. There 12s no 
-Vi. 1-n-·e of .::rny i)Crson placing any bets with thn 2ccus. ~d 0r- 
of ny money . art· nq out. The only evidence •;<1as l ;<1t t'- c)e:ccnd 
ace: s~d ·:-1ould c.::,me up 'ind whisper to him. 
23. c19s3) '" ··o. 
22. 
21. 
•·e r-.~. v~ • ..., .C: ·u .. Kr; i<.n! ( 1167) ,'il.J 21 • 
4 h r:' l . ..-, n . r· 0 v ! s i , n o f ': h n . ~e t t l n iJ ~ r d • 
1 n. r:. . ;';.1ry f-,r t ·r> rosucticn in or ''"'r t 
H"1.r.,:1 f 1r-ic r: 1·; , tn prov(? .1nyt11in J mo1 . t. 
r ')f'1J•rl 1t in ;u' ·tlr1n .:ir•pr>t r ·d () .it• 
r._n .... L·::- Lt 
""' J ... ""' ~: l l 










were nothing but matt2rs arousing str0nJ s~s icion. +owev : t: 
if they were taken in conjunGtion with the ~ar<ings in the 
book, and t c exp2rts opinion on tliem, t ey 'build up into 
a f0rmidable case a~ainst one of t1e two accus~d at least. 
The judge howev e r , e!11phaslsed on t:1e Lrrpe r t ance of t'1L 
presence of r~al factual ~vidence 3Jain~~ 2it~er of the 
accu s d , Had P1is b _en pr s= n t , th f r-t:·-=r evtd-:nce t n de r e d 
by t11e ;.oli ·? ~ffi .e r wo· ld h ve z» n t nv e l i. c;ole.J. 
of the forni:...r, he he: that it · c.s uns f~ -') =~· ict t e 
accused. 
An w secti n WdS intro' ~~din 1?,l ~hich w~s ~s fnllJdSt 
"S.11A:In ~11 r o c .c- · i 1 s ;J c r t ·-, 
ev l ·-=-n _ ~lven by c-1 o Ll r e offi er not b:low . e rank 
of s r qe nt t , t <"my o k , uccount, dor:ur;• _, 1:, .. ~ 1r<:i":'1 
rit.ng, cirrul r, r rl o o t , _ a r t i r: 1 _ ~ r· ,., ~ 1 cc 
« f 'r _ 
the c urt dd n u ln "" ( (' t: \) - '..l t; .d for bett rt 
or w •enin ~l l nt.:.l t ' 0 t I'.°" 
i r; DCCiV• · ' 
t ,.. d _er:1~~d 
• ,, 
to he Slf~ ci nt evi f t:h f ct. 
It 4p » ar s fr ..,, r 1-! r c' c of th::' .vc t Lo n t• 
,--.t the lnt1:-ntion 
oft e legisl tur-e w2s to d~prive the c~urt of its discreti n~ry 
power to ~jcrt the evid~nce of Any police of l~er not below 
t e rank of a ~e~g~ant if h~ t~stiFi~d t~~t th~ ~ocu~?nt ~efore 
the Cou r t; h a d be en us-::d or ·1as int?.nded to f)e usi~d for oettin(] 









This possible interpretution ary,·:-::-:: +-.e; 'lave ;)!." sv ok o d 
t o o consternation of !-1. T. CMG, .J. in the a.ve of r.c.! 7E~.' 
LH01'4& vs. P • P • 
24 ~h.re thA le~rncd Magistr~te h~d c nvictcd 
t'.1e aCCUS':'d despite the evid~_nce of t'.ie police ex o r t ·.-1\0 h d 
frankly admitt::d t'1at it was Lrnoo s s Lb I for ·11 to s::-.y t h at; 
the clos of cne pro~Pcuti)n c~se. 
He . i 
s c and. rd p r ac .Lc ... s t .~xp .rt ~vid•-"'nce. 
the , . l: ti 11 ':1 ( , \1'11.! n din.; n t ) 
com l t c Lv with t'1c ' ' t or _ x p . r t c v i d . n c . •; •J ~ 
1' 
.... t , l n 
effect, any po l d : .. "'rn n , ow .v r rnv e r ae d I n -.1 .. ·', 1 0f '. 1" 
.O··ok.1a er, o Ln ny f rm of 
.. l:t in 1 w~1,1::; ~ -t=c , :> c )fi1 ! ; 
to L~:>ti.fy • ity 0f x p vr t o n 
j I )j '·t 
t.o r .i '. ._ ·' 
in wn Lch e ,1<Jy ~e n . '5 1 u t ... 
of ·;uilt until '"·1 ..... c o n t r ry i _1rov .d ~Y .h e 










it "'lildly. Forli.=ir.Lnt, it v. a s s r. i d , c· .. 1 .c 2nytliinc; <x c c p t; 
make a man a woman or a woman a ~2n. The ~ct of 19£1 must 
I think, be an ~Jr&~~ous i~st~nre of o~ni~o~ence ~hen the 
bray of an ass c an Le me t amo ep no so d into t o e voice of .h e ex- 
pe r t - the nnly li;;1itations being t h a t the policenan should 
h~ve attain2d a cettain r nk, howev_r he did it, ·nclJ in~ 
" 
of course, climbing 1 p ~JY he ;:tge2.nc; process. 
He wont on furt: 2r to say, at the s:rne page 
"• ••• howe v e r u n f e t : oraab l e _.1'2 eel l .ctive ·vi ~.:b· of th: 
legislature hould b e to less r -:1en, :he 1,; 21 p r r su np t Lon 
r o t s d by s e c t Lon 14/\ is a r eb i t t ble ni , It d.:J··!~ vo t; in 
any rn mer s hu t out closer =:; ru t i.ny .'nLi : 1· o t Lo n o f ·_: e 
evid. ce. 
im o su s on t.h •. ou n t s ty c 
even morn ili9cnt to s : ti ·fy it::;elf o t ~ .•.. r_;t ~ l+ o ... r 
\j 
accused before convicting. 
It is my numbl .: t , L .i · 1 
-, l . t ~ .~ 0 in L ...> • 
e vi . 11..:? n c e s no u l d ..) -= c 11 : ck .= d : i r - t • 
C.Oh S l rl.4.t! 
In f..)ct, ~1e C3n a l s o ccn+-i 1"'2 it ano cve r '•Jdy.L'.:.e: 
·' 0 ct i. n ., a y s t :1 :! t "e vi ·Jc n c e '' g iv :: n by n pc 1 i :: e o f : ~ r '.: :, :.i ::: : i r. .:; 










short of evid~nce is suf~icient evidence of t~e f-ct. 
It shoul logicc::1lly follow then t:1at pf a po l Lc e w, Ll e 
purporting to i'le expert evidence bazes hi~ opinion on o 
hunch or intuition or where his opinion is uns~~port~d ~y 
reason, t:•1~ court will surely not be d ab a r r e d .=:-on r e j e c t i nc 
+:hat op I n Lon ,ol::; not be , 1· ev i ,~,,r.::e within the ne an i r, : _f 
that word ~n . _r t. ~ provlsi n of lL - vi .: 0 n ,_: e en ,")r: ti,, '1 L • ..>UL'? l y 
it does not mec..n t. t the CcuC"t is obli ~d t I icc= p t ~ach 
b~en f, bti.:-lt ··d, wh·~r it i .. J. ildncc;s to I<": .-~i't lt ,,.. 
piece of adm i sibl . ev lJen 
F · n l I y i :l '3 to •J _ r e: ~- rn 1 ~d ::h. t v1.i nee 
of n ,cco lie. th.r l~ 1c n ~e • t 
"Co r r o: or ti -n " can take r ian ' .... :.- ' :.J 
2:) 
'I \ .1::::c1.J cc· d' •; ) u t no t= or ?S in -,\ .1.~"r · vs. 
in sw a l lowln 1 u .n ·er of 
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During the course of preparing for this project 
paper, the writer had the pleasure of having a short 
interview with a Mr. Kong Fook Yew, Superintendent 
of Police, Records Division, Kuala Lumpur. He was 
very helpful and enthusistic and we discussed some 
changes and recommendations which is necessary to help 
curb the rising rate of gaming in the country. With 
some help from him the writer was able to view things 
in a better perspective. 
Illegal gaming is found to have increased 
steadily over the years. The figures in Appendix A 
show that in the year 1973 for inst nee, of which 
2,682 raids were made, 6106 p ople were arrested. The 
number of arrests increased to 8,371 by the year 1975. 
This may not be a staggering figure by some standards 
but it ls enough to warrant some concern by the 
authorities whilst it may be accepted that gambling is 
but a social vice nevertheless it leads to other 
criminal activities more dangerous, and for this reason 
it should be viewed with some concern. 
i' Mr. Kong ook Yew feels that there is in effect 










impossible to eradicate it totally. The evil is onecf 
long repute for we read of Stamford Raffles taking 
stern measures to suppress gambling even in 1823. 
Legislation may match the cunning methods of 
evasion but it is very doubtful if the long arm of 
the law will reach the small and big time gamblers 
through legislation alone. This curse of gambling 
has its roots coiled around the Malaysian Society. 
It is at these roots that o¥r efforts should be 
directed if gambling is to be suppressed. 
I. ENHANC :..0 ~UNISHMl::NT 
If we canoot eradicate gambling, we should 
at least try to contain or control it. One of 
the ways is through revising the p nalty clauses 
and increasing the punishment meted out. 
Records in the past have shown that courts 
have not imposed sufficiently heavy punishment 
to deter gamblers. This may be so because the 
maximum penalty provided for in the Common Gami." q 
Houses Ordinance 1953 appears relatively light. 
Take for instance offences under S.4, 5 and 8 the 
maximum penalty is imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding 










Under S.6, 7 and 9 the maximum penalty is 
a fine not exceeding $250. 
The Common Gaming Houses Ordinance came into 
force in 1953 and the penalties mentioned above 
were considered adequate in those days. Times 
have changed and by today's standards the 
maximum for fines especially would seem 
negligible. What morP. if those arrested are under 
the employ of the big kingpins, they would not feel 
the brunt at all. Infact the normal course 
taken by the accused was to plead guilty and pay 
a stipend fine for the big bosses usually supply 
them enough to meet "emergencies". 
It is proposed therefore thnt the maximum 
penalties be increased substantially. According 
to the police, for offences under S,4, 5 and 8 
the maximum penalty should be increased to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or 
to a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to both such 
imprisonment and fine, and for offences under 
s.6, 7 and 9 the maximum penalty be increased to 
fine not exceeding five hundred dollars. 
With the penalties increased, the courts 










serious view in such cases and mete out 
appropriate punishment to deter potential 
gamblers. 
2. a) SCHEDULED INSTRUMENT OF GAMING 
b) SCHEDULED GAMES OF CHANCE OR MIXED GAMES OF 
CHANCE AND SKILL 
The prosecution depends to a great extent on 
the presumptions under the Common Gaming Houses 
Ordinance to secure a conviction against persons 
arrested for gaming in a common gaming house. 
Despite these presumptions the prosecution still 
finds it extremely difficult to prove its case. 
There have been instances in the past where 
as a result of the prosecution~ inability to 
identify the type of game played, the accused were 
acquitted and discharged before the defence is 
being called. Take for example where the 
miding party merely recovered a set of dominoes 
and does not actually see the type of game in 
progress at the time of the raid. Now, a set of 
dominoes could be used to play more than one type 
of game for example, "Pai Kow" "Tien Kow" or 
"Tan Ngau"; and since the prosecution was unable 
to identify the type of game played at the time 










The Home Minister could perhaps take up 
this issue because by virtue of the powers vested 
upon him under s.2(2)(b) be can by notification 
in the Gazette declare any game, method, device, 
scheme or competition specified or described in 
such notification to be a game of chance or 
mixed game of chance and skill for the purposes 
of this Ordinance and thereupon it shall be 
irrebutable presumption of law that such game, 
method, device, scheme or competition is a game 
of chance or mixed game of chance and skill as the 
case may be for the purposes of this Ordinance. 
This will bring our Common Gaming Houses Ordinance 
in line with the Common Gaming Houses Act (cap.96) 
(1) 
of Singapore • 
The Singapore Authorities have not stopped ~r r 
for they have lightened the difficulties of the 
prosecution by scheduling fifteen sets of 
( 2) 
instruments or appliances for gaming • Hence 
there is not need for the prosecution to 
specially prove that a specific article is or is 
(1) See Appendix B for the schedule of games gazetted 
by the Minister under the Singapore Ordinance. 










not an instrument of gaming within the Ordinance. 
3. ENGLI~H GAMING ACT 1968(3) 
It is proposed here to refer briefly into 
the recent amendment and repeal of the gaming 
laws in England and the adoption by them of a 
totally new outlook on the law of gaming. The 
writer does not wish this to be a direct 
proposal but it could be very enlightening to 
peruse the objects and reasons(4) of the new 
gaming laws there, for lt ~as a lot of practical 
appeal. After all the emphasis in the 1968 
Gaming Act is more on method of control than on 
the question of th~ 1 g lity of gambling at all. 
(3) The Gaming Act 1968 was passed on the 24th October 
1968. It comprises 54 section~ and 15 scheul~s. 
It also has four parts namely:- 
Part I (SS 1 to 8) deals with gaming elsewhere than 
on premises licensed or legistered under the Act. 
Part II (SS.9 to 25) deals with gaming on premises 
licensed or legistered under the Act. 
Part III (SS.26 to 39) is concerned with gaming by 
medns of machines. 
Part IV (SS. 40 to 54) contains a no. of miscellaneous 
and supplementary provisions. 
See: Shaws, Guide to the Gaming Act 1968, 2nd 










In the Dew act, Parliament has abolished 
the offence of "unlawful gaming" as uch , and, 
discarded the "conditions of lawful gaming" as 
a universal test of criminality. In their place 
it has introduced a system of permission and 
control akin to that under ~hich betting offices 
are licensed and operated. But in order to make 
a fresh start and clear the way for the new 
system the Act has repealed the whole of the law 
of gaming. 
The new act defines certain categories of 
places or premises and lays down the sort of 
gaming that may be lawfully carri don in each 
of them. Consequently no sort of gaming is perse 
unlawful but may become unlawful if it is carried 
on otherwise th~n in the pl ce and under th 
condition~ which have been laid down for it. It 
follows that the type of gaming which will be 
permitted anywhere is that to which the degree of 
control exercised over the premises is appropriat~. 
(4) It was the failure of the Acts of 1960 and 1963 
to achieve their purpos~ (to prevent the 
exploitation of gaming by Commercial interests) 










a) METHOD OF CONTROL 
The instruments of control under the act are 
licence and registratioa. Registration is for 
member clubs of good standing, whether social 
clubs or what. The licence entails the greater 
degree of control; it is granted only after 
strict investigation by more than one body of 
persons and may be terminated if the conduct of 
the gaming or the accounts, management or staff 
of the club fall short of the required standrad, 
fontrol by r gistration is much less strict. 
b) MEANS OF ENFORC~MENT 
The present Act is unlikely to fail (as the 
act of 1963 failed) for lack of m ns of enforcing 
it. It is on the contrary remarkable for the 
number of devices built into lt nd interlocking 
with each other designed to ensure, as far as 
possible, that the intentions of the legislature 
are carried out. There are 4 bodies who can 
provide, either separately or in combination, 
safeguard against a breakdown of the Act. 
The Gaming Board, in addition to their 










hand with the licensing authorities, who can 
refuse, terminate, restrict or cancel a licence 
if there have been contravention or misconduct, 
and who, in exercising this powers, must take 
into account advice given them by the Board. 
The latter, in giving their consent to an 
application, will be in a position to take 
panoramic view of gaming t n r ouqhou t the country, 
leaving the justices free to confine their 
~ttention, if they so wish, to local considerations. 
Then come the regulations of the Secretary of 
State. They can prescripe in detail the conduct 
of the gaming and even the operation of machines, 
and can be a powerful mans of securing that the 
gaming is in all respects fairly and properly 
conducted and that the provisions of the ct are 
not eroded by practices which are indirectly 
contraventions. 
Furthermore, the Secretary of State is 
another link between the Gaming Board, with whom 
he must consult before making regulation, and the 
licensing authority,whasepowers to grant or renew 
~ 
licences he can modify tH-8 regulation. 
finally the fear of being disqualified by the 









defer a promoter than the fine or imprisonment 
to which he is also liable. 
Briefly that is how matters stand in England 
with regards to gaming. The authorities have 
tried to tackle the situation by providing 
guidance and the course along which gaming should 
flow. The writer submits that the idea is rather 
attractive and merits S0'1Je consideration by the 
appropriate authorities. Presently, the only 
section akin to the Eriq Li ah way is µrovirled for 
in S.27A(J) of the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance 
i.e. with regards to power to lie nee promotion 
and organisation of gaming by a company, upon whose 
ganction our local Empat Number kor and the 
Gentings Highland Casino were set up. We have 
already initiated an important ~p forwdrd and 
it has proved to be very reliable, es ecially in 
view of the tremendous amount of r~venue the 
Government can collect from these licensed clubs(4). 
Furthermore the inherent evils in gaming can be 
curbed by the provision of strict rules ·vis-a-vis 
amount of stakes etc in the licensed clubs. 
(3) Amended by Act A56/71. 










YEAR TOTAL RAIDS TOTAL H:?SONS ARRESTED 
1970 3135 7476 
1971 3486 7478 
1972 2856 5996 
1973 2682 6106 
1974 3027 7755 
1975 2587 8371 
By Courtesy of the 













No. s 185 - THE cor xon GA:·rr-:G HCGS~:s Q["'DI f NCE, 1961 
(No. 2 JJ 19 61) 
In exercise of the po\~rs conferred by p~ragr2ph 
(b) of Subsection (2) of Section 2 of the Common Gaming 
Ho~ses Ordin2nce, 1961, the Minister for Home .ffairs 
hereby declares the 0ames, methods, devices, schemes or 
compe .itions set out in the Schedules hereto to be games 
of Chance of mixed games of -hance and skill 'or the 
purposes of the s id Or~in nee:- 
THE - :H..:~ULE 
( 1) The Game of Pai Kow or Pan Tieng 
( 2) The Game of Tien Kow 
( 3} The Gome of Tau Ngau 
(4) The Game of Chap Ji Kee Panj ng 
( 5) The Game of Fan Tan or Thuahn. 
(6) The Ga'e of Poh or Poh Kam or Lien Poh 
( 7) The Game nf Pek Bin 
(8) The Game of Belankas 
(9) The Game of Mahjong 
( 10) The g me of 'Roulette' 
( 11) Tre Game of Rajah Kena 
( 12) The Game of Tik m Tik m 
(13) The ~ me of 'Thr e C rds' or Pa Ku or ~rm Ch -n 
or Daun Tiga 
( 14) The r.1me of 'Pu.lr' 
( 15) The Game of 'P0ker' 
( 16) The G me of •xussidn PokPr' 
( 17) The Game of 'Twenty-one' or Y e p Yat or 
Ji It Tiam or Dua Puloh ~atu 
( 18) The Game of Main Terope 
( 19) The Game of Minta Daun 
(20) The Game of 'Fishing' or Ang Tiam or Ti w Yue 
( 21) The Game of 'Five C rds' or Tan 
(22) The Game of Si-Ki-Phuay 
(23) T. e Game of See Goh Lak 
(24) The Game of Ta Kai 
(25) The Game of Chong Yuen Chow 
(26) The Game of Tai Sai 
(27) The Game of Hoo, Hey, How 
(28) The Game of Soo Sik or See Sak 
(29) The Game of Chi Kee 
(30) The Game of Seong Kum of Pin Kum 
(31) The Game of Luk Foo 
(32) The Game of Sap Ng Hor 
(33) The Game of Tung Koon 
(34) The Game of Oh Peh 
(No. Min. H. • 2092/59: No • LL 











No. S 186 - TH~ COMMON GAMING HOUSES ORDINANCE, 1961. 
(No. 2 of 1961). 
In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection 
(3) of section 2 of the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance, 1961, 
the Minister for Home Affairs hereby declares the articles 
set out in the Sehedule ~ereto to be instruments or 
appliances for gaming. 
THE SCHECULt; 
(1) Dominoes. 
( ") The Poh. 
(3) The Pek Bin top or £ight-sid d top. 
(4) The Belankas top or Four-sid d top. 
(5) The Mah Jong tiles. 
(6) The English playing c rds. 
(7) The Standard Dice. 
(8) The Hoo, Hey, How Dice. 
(9) The 'Four Colours Cards' or Soo Sik Pai. 
(10) The 'Six Tigers Cards' or Luk Foo Pai. 
(11) The Chi Kee Cards. 
(12) The 'Double Gold Cards' or ·~old Change 
Cards' or Seong Kum Pai or Pin Kum Pai. 
(13) The •Fifteen Points Cards' or Sap Ng Her Pai. 
(14) The Tung Koon Cards or Tung Koon Pai. 
(15) The 'Black and White Cards' or Oh Poh Pai. 













S1 MPLE: OF TAX P .·.ID TO 
YSAR 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Pool-Betting 7.9 .21 27 28 31.S 37 47.6 
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